We have deliberately waited a few days before commenting on “Liberation Day” and the fallout that would come from President Trump’s new tariffs regime.It will go down as just another historical period of heightened volatility, uncertainty, risk, and a whole manner of market turmoil. This is why we wanted to put what is happening right now into some context. (If that is possible, considering how volatile the period is and how erratic and how quick the president's manner can change.)US markets have seen this kind of violent move only three times since the 1950s. The S&P’s over 10 per cent drop in the final two sessions of the week following President Trump's "Liberation Day" tariff announcement has it in rare company – and not in a good way - October 1987 (Black Monday), November 2008 (Global Financial Crisis), March 2020 (COVID-19).So, why such a reaction?The market reaction reflects not the ‘shock’ but the scale and brevity of the tariffs. A 10% across-the-board tariff was broadly expected. There were some calculations as much as 15 to 20% judging by the net $1 trillion in and out of the federal government revenue. (This is the impact of DOGE and other government spending cuts coupled with the tariffs now in place that will offset the promised 0% personal income tax for those earning up to US$150,000)But what markets didn’t see coming was the country-specific layer. Take China as an example; the additional 34% reciprocal tariff on Chinese goods pushed the total to 54%. With other measures factored in, the effective burden could approach 65%.Then there were the tariffs that were tied to trade deficits, hitting Japan, South Korea and most emerging markets between the eyes (i.e. Vietnam).The EU saw a 20% rate, which was within expectations, while the UK, Australia, New Zealand and others landed at 10%. Canada and Mexico were spared, as was Russia, North Korea and Belarus, interestingly enough.Energy was excluded, which is unsurprising considering Trump’s goal of getting energy down, down and staying down. Pharmaceuticals and semiconductors were also carved out, however, this is more down to the probability of more targeted action like that of steel and aluminium.Now, what is different about this market shock and risk off trading is that it would send funds flowing to the US dollar, ratcheting it higher. But not this time. The dollar weakened against the euro. Theories as to why range from Europe’s lighter tariff load to euro-based investors pulling money out of the US. The same could be said of the Swiss Franc.All this leads to an average effective tariff rate of around 22%. That number will likely climb once product-specific tariffs on areas like pharmaceuticals and lumber are formalised. Some of this may be negotiated down, but not soon, and the possibility of tit-for-tat retaliation like China has now entered into could actually see it going higher still as the President looks to outdo country responses.The broader uncertainty this introduces to the US outlook is now at its highest since early 2020 and has the markets pricing in 110 basis points of Fed rate cuts this year – a near 5 cut call shows just how unprecedented this is.In fact, in no time in living memory has a developed economy lifted trade barriers this aggressively or abruptly. What has been implemented is textbook economics 101 supply-side shock.Input costs go up, finished goods get pricier, and the ripple effects hit margins and employment. Expect to see this in the next six months.Expect core PCE inflation to finish the year at 3.5% —nearly a full percentage point higher than the consensus forecast from just a week ago.Real GDP growth is forecast to slow to 0.1% on a quarter-on-quarter basis. That path may be volatile as Q1 could look worse due to soft consumption and strong imports, with a mechanical bounce in Q2.What has been lost in the chaos of last Thursday and Friday’s trade was the March Non-farm payrolls jobs print came in at 228,000, which was above consensus, the caveat being it is less so after downward revisions to prior months.Hospitality hiring was strong, likely helped by a weather rebound that won’t repeat. Government payrolls are holding steady for now, but cuts are coming. Layoffs in defence and aerospace (DOGE) are already underway, and tariffs will act as a brake on new hiring. Expect softer reports ahead.Unemployment ticked up slightly to 4.15%, reflecting a modest rise in participation. That’s still within range, giving the Fed cover to hold off on immediate action. But if job losses build pressure on the Fed to act, it will increase quickly.The consensus now is for the first rate cut of this cycle to start in May, triggered by softer April payrolls and earlier signs of deterioration in jobless claims and business sentiment.Zooming out from just a US-centric point of view, the macro standpoint is just as bad if not worse. The scale of tariffs adds pressure on industrial production, trade volumes and cross-border investment.That’s feeding into commodity markets, where the outlook has turned more cautious.Brent is expected to fall into the low US$60s as trade frictions and oversupply build. LNG looks weaker too, with soft Asian demand and less urgency in Europe to restock. Iron ore is more exposed to China, and the reciprocal tariffs put a vulnerability into the price due to the broader global slowdown and higher prices to the US.Looking at China specifically, infrastructure remains a key policy lever that would offset the possible loss of demand in aluminium, copper, and steel. Monetary indicators are beginning to turn, suggesting the start of a new easing cycle. It also suggests that policy remains inward-facing, and a focus on domestic stability would mean a metals-heavy growth path. Thus suggesting Australia could be the ‘lucky country’ once more and could escape the full burden of the global upheaval.In short, the global reaction isn’t just about tariffs. It’s about what happens when policy shocks collide with already-fragile global demand, and central banks are forced to navigate inflation that’s driven by politics, not just price cycles.This is the question for traders and investors alike over the coming period.
Same tariff. Different earnings hit.
That is the key split for traders watching this earnings season. The US side is mainly about margin timing. The Asia side is about demand sensitivity. Not every export sector carries the same level of US demand risk.
TL;DR
- US companies may face margin pressure as tariffed inventory moves through earnings.
- Asian exporters may face volume pressure if US buyers reduce orders.
- The timing is different: US retailers may feel the impact later, while Asian exporters may see it earlier through weaker order books.
- Textiles, apparel and basic consumer goods are likely more sensitive to US demand.
- Semiconductors and AI hardware may be less directly exposed to US consumers, but still carry policy, capex and valuation risk.
The big picture
Tariffs are paid at the US border by importers. From there, the cost can move through the system in several ways: higher prices, weaker margins, lower supplier prices, lower demand or a mix of all four.
Research cited by the Kiel Institute and New York Fed suggests US buyers and businesses may be absorbing a significant share of the tariff burden. That matters because it changes where the earnings pressure shows up first.
For a US retailer, the problem is straightforward but uncomfortable. If the company raises prices, demand may weaken. If it absorbs the tariff cost, margins may compress. If it still has older inventory, the hit may not show up immediately.
For an Asian exporter, the pressure can arrive through a different channel. If US buyers become cautious, they may order less. The exporter may keep prices relatively stable, but factory utilisation falls, fixed costs are spread across fewer units and earnings pressure builds.
That is why this is not just a tariff story. It is an earnings timing story.
US companies: the margin problem
The US side of the tariff story is about cost absorption.
Retailers, apparel brands, consumer electronics sellers and appliance companies often rely on imported goods, components or packaging. When tariff costs rise, they may try to protect margins through price increases, supplier negotiations, sourcing changes or inventory management.
The challenge is that none of these are clean solutions.
Price increases can test consumer demand. Supplier negotiations may take time. Sourcing changes can be expensive or slow. Inventory timing can make the first result look better than the underlying cost trend.
This is why earnings calls matter. Management commentary around pricing actions, tariff mitigation, sourcing, vendor negotiations and inventory timing may reveal more than headline sales growth.
What to watch on the US side
These signals may provide useful context in upcoming earnings reports:
If margins hold while sales remain stable, companies may be managing the pressure. If sales rise but margins fall, tariff costs may not be passing through cleanly. If guidance becomes more cautious, the market may start pricing a delayed earnings impact.
Asian exporters: the volume problem
The Asia side is not always about exporters cutting prices.
In many categories, Asian suppliers operate in competitive global markets with limited pricing power. If US buyers reduce orders, exporters may feel the impact through lower volumes rather than lower unit prices.
That distinction matters.
A company can report stable prices and still face earnings pressure if factories are running below normal utilisation. Lower volumes can reduce operating leverage, delay capital expenditure and weaken guidance.
The highest-risk sectors are usually those most closely tied to US retail demand, seasonal buying cycles and low-margin production.
Which Asian sectors are most exposed?
1. Textiles and apparel
Textiles and apparel are among the clearest examples of US demand exposure.
These exporters are often tied directly to US retail orders, private-label contracts and seasonal buying cycles. If US retailers turn cautious, orders can be delayed, reduced or cancelled relatively quickly.
Risk is higher because margins are often thin, production is labour-intensive and buyers may have more power in negotiations.
Relevant export markets: Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and parts of China.2. Basic consumer goods
This includes toys, household goods, furniture, simple appliances and other discretionary or semi-discretionary exports.
These categories are exposed when US retailers reduce inventory or when consumers pull back from non-essential spending. Tariffs can add pressure if buyers try to push costs back onto suppliers.
Relevant export markets: China, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.3. Electronics assembly
Electronics assembly is more mixed.
Lower-end consumer electronics can be sensitive to US household demand. Higher-value components or enterprise-linked electronics may be more resilient, depending on end-market exposure.
This sector can also be harder to read because supply chains are complex. A company may look like a technology exporter, but its actual earnings sensitivity may still depend on US consumer replacement cycles.
Relevant export markets: China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines.4. Machinery and industrial goods
Machinery is less directly tied to US consumer demand than apparel or household goods. The risk is more about business investment.
If US companies delay capital expenditure because tariff uncertainty rises, machinery orders may weaken. However, order books can provide some buffer, and specialised products may have more pricing power.
Relevant export markets: Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan and Singapore.5. Semiconductors
Semiconductors are less directly exposed to US retail demand than textiles or consumer goods. Demand is often tied to broader technology cycles, autos, industrials, cloud infrastructure and AI investment.
That does not make the sector risk-free. Tariffs, export controls, geopolitics and a weaker global capex cycle can still affect earnings expectations.
Relevant export markets: Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and parts of China.6. AI hardware and data-centre supply chains
AI hardware is more tied to cloud capital expenditure and data-centre buildouts than day-to-day consumer spending.
The risk is different. It is less about US shoppers buying fewer goods and more about whether AI capex expectations remain realistic, whether policy restrictions expand and whether valuations already price in strong growth.
Relevant export markets: Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and advanced electronics supply-chain hubs.A simple sector risk map
Why timing matters
The US and Asia timelines may not line up.
A US retailer may still be selling older inventory, so the tariff impact can be delayed. Margins may hold in one quarter, then weaken as new tariffed inventory becomes a larger share of the sales mix.
An Asian exporter may see the pressure earlier if US buyers reduce orders before the cost hit appears in US consumer prices.
That creates a split earnings map:
- US side: delayed margin pressure.
- Asia side: earlier volume pressure.
- Policy side: tariff exemptions, pauses or escalations can change the setup quickly.
The mistake is assuming a clean and immediate tariff impact. A strong US retailer result does not automatically mean tariff pressure is gone. It may only mean older inventory is still flowing through. A stable Asian exporter margin does not automatically mean demand is healthy. Volumes may be weakening beneath the surface.
What to watch next
On the US side, gross margins, inventory commentary, same-store sales and second-half guidance may provide useful context.
On the Asia side, export volumes, factory utilisation, order backlogs, working capital and capital expenditure guidance may be more relevant.
Across both regions, tariff policy remains the swing factor. Exemptions, pauses or new restrictions could quickly change market expectations.
Sector charts may provide additional context on whether market pricing is aligning with the earnings narrative, but they should be read alongside company commentary and macro data from the economic calendar.






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